There is a particular moment in clinical practice that I think deserves more scrutiny.
A patient behaves in a way that is difficult to understand.
They become angry when a boundary is established.
They withdraw when a relationship becomes emotionally intimate.
They repeatedly miss appointments.
They appear motivated for treatment but struggle to follow through.
Someone asks why.
And the answer comes almost immediately.
"Well, they have borderline personality disorder."
"They're avoidant."
"That's their narcissism."
The explanation sounds clinical.
It sounds informed.
It may even be diagnostically accurate.
But have we actually explained anything?
Or have we simply given the behaviour a name?
Diagnosis has an important place in mental healthcare.
It helps clinicians recognise patterns, communicate with one another, consider evidence-based treatments and identify difficulties that might otherwise remain misunderstood.
For some patients, receiving a diagnosis can be profoundly validating.
Experiences that once felt confusing or inexplicable finally have a recognisable description.
I would not dismiss that.
But there is a distinction between classification and explanation.
A diagnosis can tell us that certain difficulties tend to occur together.
It does not necessarily explain why a particular person developed those difficulties, what maintains them or what function a particular behaviour serves.
And those questions are often central to psychotherapy.
Consider two people who repeatedly withdraw from relationships.
Both may describe discomfort with intimacy.
Both may avoid emotional vulnerability.
Both may appear detached when others attempt to become close.
From a descriptive perspective, their behaviour looks remarkably similar.
But psychologically, the processes could be very different.
One person may associate closeness with the expectation of rejection.
Another may have learned that intimacy involves losing autonomy.
For someone else, withdrawal may protect against shame, perceived inadequacy or the fear of becoming dependent.
And another person may simply be responding to a relationship that is genuinely intrusive or unsafe.
The behaviour is similar.
The psychological meaning is not.
If we treat the observable behaviour as though it explains itself, we risk offering the same intervention to people whose difficulties arise from very different circumstances.
This becomes especially important when working with personality difficulties.
A patient becomes angry after a therapist establishes a boundary.
The behaviour is documented as emotional dysregulation.
Perhaps that description is accurate.
But what happened psychologically?
Did the patient experience the boundary as rejection?
Did it evoke humiliation?
Did they interpret the therapist's decision as evidence that they were unimportant?
Was the anger an attempt to restore a sense of control?
Or was the therapist's communication unnecessarily abrupt, inconsistent or insensitive?
These possibilities are not interchangeable.
And none should be assumed without investigation.
The task is not to excuse harmful behaviour by finding a psychological explanation.
It is to understand the process sufficiently well that treatment can address something more meaningful than the behaviour alone.
A diagnosis may describe the pattern. It does not automatically explain the person.
I think there is also an uncomfortable professional issue here.
Diagnostic language can sometimes protect clinicians from uncertainty.
When a patient is difficult to engage, it is tempting to describe them as resistant.
When they challenge treatment, they may be described as lacking insight.
When they become intensely attached to a therapist, the relationship may be interpreted primarily through their pathology.
Occasionally, these observations identify something clinically important.
But they can also become conclusions that prevent further thinking.
What does resistance mean in this particular relationship?
What exactly is the person being asked to accept?
Could their reluctance reflect fear, mistrust, shame or a previous experience of being misunderstood?
Might the treatment itself be poorly matched to their needs?
These questions do not invalidate diagnosis.
They prevent diagnosis from becoming the end of clinical curiosity.
Psychological formulation offers a different kind of understanding.
Rather than asking only which diagnostic criteria a person meets, formulation attempts to connect their present difficulties with developmental experiences, relationships, beliefs, emotional processes, coping strategies and current circumstances.
It asks not simply what is happening, but how it may have developed and what continues to sustain it.
However, formulation deserves scrutiny too.
A beautifully constructed psychological explanation is not necessarily a correct one.
Clinicians can become attached to their interpretations.
We can overestimate the significance of childhood experiences, impose theoretical assumptions or construct narratives that sound convincing but have not been adequately tested.
A formulation should therefore remain open to revision.
It should be developed collaboratively where possible.
And it should become more useful through what we learn in treatment, rather than more elaborate simply because we have become better at explaining it.
Clinical sophistication is not measured by how complicated our interpretations sound.
Sometimes it is measured by our willingness to discover that we were wrong.
Perhaps the most important distinction is that diagnosis and formulation answer different questions.
Diagnosis can help us identify the nature and severity of a clinical presentation.
Formulation attempts to understand how those difficulties operate within a particular person's life.
Neither automatically replaces the other.
A diagnosis without individual understanding risks reducing a person to a category.
A formulation without sufficient diagnostic assessment risks overlooking important clinical information.
Good psychotherapy requires us to hold both possibilities in mind.
To recognise patterns without assuming that everyone within a category is psychologically identical.
To develop explanations without treating them as established facts.
And to remain curious even when we believe we already know what we are looking at.
Because perhaps the danger is not that clinicians use diagnostic labels.
It is that, occasionally, we become so comfortable with the label that we forget there is still a person left to understand.
And that leaves a question worth asking ourselves as clinicians:
When we say we understand a patient, do we understand their experience or have we simply become familiar with their diagnosis?