There is something paradoxical about the way we sometimes approach accountability.
When someone behaves destructively, we want them to understand the seriousness of what they have done.
We want them to recognise the consequences.
To acknowledge the people they have hurt.
To take responsibility.
And sometimes, consciously or otherwise, we believe that making them feel sufficiently bad about themselves will help achieve this.
But what if the emotional experience we are trying to produce is precisely what makes responsibility more difficult?
In psychotherapy, I think it is important to distinguish between guilt and shame.
Although they frequently occur together, they are not psychologically identical.
Guilt generally concerns an action.
I did something wrong.
Shame concerns a more global evaluation of the self.
There is something wrong with me.
This distinction is not absolute. People experience both emotions in different ways, and neither has an invariably positive or negative effect.
But the difference becomes clinically significant when we consider how people respond to having caused harm.
Guilt can direct attention towards a particular behaviour and its consequences.
It may encourage acknowledgement, apology or attempts to repair what happened.
Shame, particularly when it becomes overwhelming, can direct attention towards the person's perceived inadequacy.
Instead of thinking about what they have done, they become preoccupied with what their behaviour supposedly proves about who they are.
And that can make accountability considerably more complicated.
Consider someone in addiction recovery who has returned to substance use after a period of abstinence.
They may already understand that their behaviour has consequences.
They may recognise the impact on their family.
They may feel disappointed, frightened or uncertain about what happens next.
Now imagine that the response they receive reinforces the belief that they are fundamentally unreliable, weak or incapable of change.
The intention may be to confront the seriousness of the situation.
But the psychological effect may be different.
Rather than becoming more capable of examining what happened, the person may become increasingly defensive.
They might conceal information.
Minimise the extent of the problem.
Withdraw from treatment.
Or become so preoccupied with self-condemnation that they struggle to engage with the practical work of recovery.
This does not happen to everyone.
Nor does it mean that difficult conversations should be avoided.
It means that the emotional conditions under which accountability is encouraged can influence whether someone is able to participate in it.
There is an important developmental dimension here.
People do not all experience criticism in the same way.
For someone whose early relationships allowed mistakes to be acknowledged without threatening their basic sense of worth, criticism may be uncomfortable but manageable.
For another person, particularly someone whose developmental experiences involved persistent humiliation, rejection or conditional acceptance, criticism may carry a much broader psychological meaning.
A disagreement may be experienced as evidence of being unwanted.
A mistake may feel like confirmation of personal inadequacy.
An expression of disappointment may evoke fears of rejection or abandonment.
These responses are not inevitable consequences of adverse childhood experiences.
But they illustrate why the same intervention can have very different meanings for different people.
What one person experiences as constructive feedback, another may experience as an attack on their entire identity.
Understanding that distinction does not require us to avoid accountability.
It requires us to think more carefully about how accountability becomes psychologically possible.
This is particularly relevant in work with personality difficulties.
A patient may respond to perceived criticism with anger, withdrawal, denial or attempts to shift responsibility.
It can be tempting to interpret these responses simply as unwillingness to acknowledge wrongdoing.
Sometimes avoidance of responsibility is indeed part of the difficulty.
But we should also consider whether the person is struggling to tolerate the emotional meaning of having made a mistake.
If acknowledging wrongdoing immediately becomes equivalent to experiencing oneself as entirely bad, defensiveness may serve a powerful psychological function.
The person is not necessarily defending the behaviour because they believe it was acceptable.
They may be defending themselves against an intolerable conclusion about who they are.
When acknowledging a mistake feels like condemning the entire self, defending the mistake can become easier than taking responsibility for it.
That distinction matters.
Because treatment aimed exclusively at confronting denial may overlook the psychological process maintaining it.
There is, however, a danger in taking this argument too far.
We should not assume that every instance of defensiveness reflects underlying shame.
People may deny wrongdoing because they genuinely disagree with the accusation.
They may lack information.
They may fear practical consequences.
They may be protecting their interests.
And sometimes they may simply be unwilling to accept responsibility.
Psychological explanations should remain hypotheses rather than convenient conclusions.
Equally, the possibility that shame contributes to defensive behaviour does not mean that other people must tolerate its consequences.
A partner should not be expected to accept repeated mistreatment because confrontation makes someone uncomfortable.
A family should not have to abandon reasonable boundaries to protect another person's self-esteem.
And clinicians should not confuse emotional validation with the suspension of expectations.
The question is not whether accountability should exist.
It is how we create the conditions in which accountability becomes more than an exercise in humiliation.
I think this is where psychotherapy can make an important contribution.
Rather than attempting to make someone feel worse about themselves, treatment can help them develop the capacity to examine their behaviour without collapsing into a global judgement of their worth.
To recognise:
I behaved in a way that caused harm.
Without immediately concluding:
Therefore, I am incapable of being anything other than harmful.
That distinction creates room for something psychologically important.
Responsibility becomes connected to action rather than identity.
The person can examine what happened.
Understand the circumstances.
Recognise the consequences.
Consider what needs to change.
And, where appropriate, attempt to repair the damage.
None of this guarantees that change will occur.
But it offers a more useful foundation than simply increasing the intensity of self-condemnation.
Perhaps the broader difficulty is that we sometimes mistake suffering for accountability.
We see someone feeling ashamed and assume they have understood.
We see someone expressing intense remorse and assume they are ready to change.
But emotional intensity is not necessarily evidence of psychological development.
Someone can feel terrible about their behaviour while continuing to repeat it.
Another person may express relatively little visible distress while taking meaningful steps to prevent the behaviour from happening again.
This is why accountability cannot be measured solely by how badly someone feels.
It must eventually become visible in what they are prepared to recognise, change and sustain.
And perhaps this is the distinction worth remembering.
The purpose of accountability is not to produce the greatest possible amount of psychological pain.
It is to develop a more responsible relationship with one's actions and their consequences.
Which leaves a question worth considering:
When we ask someone to take responsibility, are we helping them become more capable of change, or simply making them feel worse about who they are?