There is something psychologically reassuring about being needed.
Whether we are parents, partners, therapists or professionals working in mental health, helping another person can provide a powerful sense of purpose.
We see someone struggling.
We recognise their distress.
We intervene.
And often, that intervention is exactly what they need.
But I think there is an uncomfortable question we do not ask frequently enough.
What happens when our efforts to help someone begin interfering with their ability to help themselves?
Not because we intend to make them dependent.
Not because our support is necessarily inappropriate.
But because the relationship gradually becomes organised around one person managing difficulties that the other might, with appropriate support, begin learning to manage independently.
Consider someone in early addiction recovery.
Their family has spent years responding to crises, managing practical consequences and attempting to prevent further difficulties.
They have become accustomed to intervening.
Making appointments.
Resolving financial problems.
Managing difficult conversations.
Anticipating situations that might lead to further substance use.
Much of this behaviour may have developed under genuinely frightening circumstances.
And some of it may remain necessary.
But as the person begins recovering, the family's role may need to change.
The individual may need opportunities to make decisions, tolerate frustration, experience manageable consequences and develop confidence in their own judgement.
Yet the family continues functioning as though the person remains incapable.
The intention is protection.
The unintended consequence may be that the person has fewer opportunities to discover what they can manage.
This is where I think the distinction between support and substitution becomes important.
Support helps someone develop or maintain the capacity to function.
Substitution involves repeatedly performing functions on their behalf.
Of course, there are circumstances in which substitution is entirely appropriate.
Severe illness, disability, acute psychological distress and periods of significant instability may require others to assume responsibilities temporarily or permanently.
Independence should never become a moral expectation imposed without regard for someone's actual capacities.
But when a person is capable of gradually assuming greater responsibility, continued substitution may limit their opportunities for development.
Sometimes the most meaningful form of support is not doing more for someone, but helping them become capable of doing more for themselves.
There is an important relational dimension to this.
Dependency does not always develop because one person wants to remain dependent.
Sometimes it is maintained by the expectations of the people around them.
A parent may struggle to tolerate their adult child's uncertainty.
A partner may feel anxious when they are no longer needed in the same way.
A therapist may become so invested in being helpful that they begin assuming responsibilities that belong within the patient's own process.
These patterns do not necessarily reflect conscious attempts to control another person.
They may emerge from care, anxiety, habit or longstanding relational roles.
But they can create a difficult situation.
One person becomes increasingly accustomed to receiving assistance.
The other becomes increasingly accustomed to providing it.
And over time, both may find it uncomfortable when the relationship begins to change.
This is particularly relevant in psychotherapy.
The therapeutic relationship should provide a sufficiently reliable environment for people to explore difficulties they may previously have struggled to manage.
But treatment should also remain attentive to the patient's developing capacity for agency.
There is a difference between helping someone think through a difficult decision and repeatedly making that decision for them.
Between supporting emotional regulation and becoming the only person through whom regulation feels possible.
Between offering professional guidance and encouraging the belief that meaningful progress cannot occur without the therapist's continued involvement.
None of this means that longer-term psychotherapy is inherently problematic.
Some people benefit from sustained therapeutic relationships, particularly when difficulties are complex or longstanding.
The duration of treatment alone tells us very little about whether dependency is helpful or restrictive.
The more important question concerns what the relationship makes possible.
Is the patient developing greater psychological flexibility?
Are they becoming more capable of reflecting on their experiences?
Can they increasingly participate in decisions about their own life?
Or is the therapeutic relationship gradually becoming a substitute for capacities that treatment is intended to strengthen?
We should also be careful about the language of independence.
Human beings are not psychologically designed to function without others.
Healthy development does not require the elimination of dependency.
Our relationships provide emotional security, practical assistance and opportunities for mutual regulation throughout life.
In attachment theory, the availability of a reliable relationship can support exploration rather than prevent it.
A secure base does not remove the need for autonomy.
It can make autonomy more possible.
This distinction matters because an excessive emphasis on self-sufficiency can become just as problematic as excessive assistance.
Someone who struggles to ask for help is not necessarily more psychologically mature than someone who can rely on others.
And a person who requires ongoing support is not necessarily failing to develop.
The clinical task is not to make people independent of everyone.
It is to help them develop relationships in which support and agency can coexist.
Perhaps the most difficult part of this conversation concerns the person providing the help.
Because helping is not always psychologically neutral.
We may experience another person's progress as reassuring.
But we may also experience it as a change in our own importance.
A parent whose identity has become organised around caregiving may struggle when their child requires less assistance.
A partner may feel uncertain when a previously dependent relationship becomes more equal.
A therapist may need to examine whether their desire to remain useful is influencing their clinical decisions.
These are uncomfortable possibilities.
But they deserve consideration.
Sometimes our difficulty allowing another person to grow has less to do with their capacity and more to do with what their growing independence means for us.
That does not make the original care insincere.
It simply reminds us that relationships are shaped by the psychological needs of everyone involved.
I think meaningful support requires an ongoing willingness to reconsider our role.
What someone needed six months ago may not be what they need today.
An intervention that was essential during a crisis may become unnecessary during recovery.
A relationship that once required considerable practical assistance may gradually benefit from greater reciprocity.
And sometimes, the most clinically responsible decision is to tolerate another person's uncertainty without immediately attempting to remove it.
Not every difficulty requires intervention.
Not every uncomfortable emotion needs to be resolved by someone else.
And not every mistake represents a failure of care.
Of course, this requires judgement.
There is a significant difference between allowing someone to experience manageable difficulty and abandoning them when they genuinely need assistance.
But perhaps good support is not measured by how indispensable we become.
Perhaps it is measured, at least partly, by whether our involvement expands the possibilities available to the person receiving it.
Which leaves a question worth considering:
When we help someone, are we strengthening their capacity to live their own life, or gradually making ourselves responsible for living parts of it on their behalf?